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Ernest S. Park
North Dakota State University
Eric J. Sambolec
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Research, starting with Köhler (1926), has demonstrated a type of group motivation gain,
wherein the less capable member of a dyad working conjunctively at a persistence task works
harder than comparable individuals. To explore possible boundary conditions of this effect, the
current experiment systematically varied the amount and timing of performance feedback group
members received. Results showed: (a) continuous feedback of both members’ performance was
not necessary for producing the effect; (b) the effect was attenuated, but not eliminated by
delaying and restricting feedback, such that group members only learned which of them was the
less capable worker (but not how long s/he persisted) sometime after the task trial was
completed; and (c) the motivation gain was eliminated in the absence of any performance
feedback (i.e. when neither worker could tell who quit first nor how long either had persisted).
Some implications of these results for currently viable explanations of the Köhler effect are
discussed. It is concluded that the effect is likely to result from several distinct processes.
keywords feedback, groups, motivation gain, performance
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CONSIDERABLE research has documented that
members of task performing groups often
engage in social loafing—that is, they exert less
effort than comparable individual performers
(see Karau & Williams, 1993, and Shepperd,
1993, for reviews). Demonstrations of the
opposite result, where one or more workers try
harder when performing in a group or team
than as individuals have been less frequent. Yet
there is some evidence of such group motiva-
tion gains in the literature, particularly in the
last decade or so (e.g. Hertel, Kerr, & Messé,
2000; Stroebe, Diehl, & Abakoumkin, 1996;
Williams & Karau, 1991). The present study
builds on this research by exploring boundary
conditions of one such group motivation-gain
phenomenon—the tendency of less able
workers to perform better when members of a
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team working under conjunctive task demands
(where the performance of the least capable
member defines the group’s level of perform-
ance; Kelley et al., 2003, Entry #9; Steiner, 1972)
than when working individually. This phenom-
enon has been named after Otto Köhler, who
first reported evidence for it nearly 80 years ago
(Köhler, 1926, 1927). While more recent investi-
gations (e.g. Hertel, Deter, & Konradt, 2003;
Hertel, Kerr, & Messé, 2000; Messé, Hertel, Kerr,
Lount, & Park, 2002; Stroebe et al., 1996) have
replicated the Köhler motivation gain effect,
none have identified its boundary conditions.
Identifying and explaining such motivation
gain phenomena is valuable for several reasons.
As strictly an applied matter, much important
work is done by groups, increasingly so in
organizational teams over the last few decades
(Guzzo & Dickson, 1996; Hackman, 2002).
Identifying conditions that will maximize group
member task motivation holds promise for
enhancing the productivity of such groups.
Theoretically, Allport (1962) has suggested that
clarifying the relationship between individual
and group behavior is the master problem of
social psychology. The voluminous literature on
social loafing has led to the misconception that
group work conditions are inherently or gener-
ally demotivating. Research on the Köhler
effect and other motivation gains, such as the
social compensation effect (Williams & Karau,
1991), has belied that misconception. More
importantly, learning more about the motivat-
ing properties of groups could contribute to
developing a more powerful, unified theory
that can account for both group motivation
losses and gains. For example, Karau & Williams
(1993) have suggested that instrumentality 
value theory (e.g. Vroom, 1964) may well serve
such a function. 
Some research suggests that the Köhler
effect may result from the weaker member at
a conjunctive group task feeling particularly
indispensable to the group’s success. For
example, in Hertel et al. (2000, Experiment 2)
participants worked in two-person teams on a
physical persistence task, but they did so
under different task demands—either con-
junctive or additive, where the group score
was simply the sum of individual scores. These
conditions differed markedly with regard to
indispensability, given that the weaker
worker’s performance was substantially more
important to the team’s outcome under con-
junctive task demands. Consistent with the
indispensability explanation, results revealed a
significantly greater motivation gain under
conjunctive task demands than under additive
demands. Other research suggests that
the effect could result at least in part from the
weaker member’s social comparison with the
stronger member and, as a consequence,
upwardly revising his/her performance goal
and/or feeling heightened implicit competi-
tiveness (Kerr, Messé, Seok, Sambolec, & Park,
2005; Lount, Messé, & Kerr, 2000; Stroebe et
al., 1996). For example, when a weaker
coactor can observe the performance of a
more capable coactor, reliable motivation
gains have been observed, although they tend
to be weaker than those observed under con-
junctive group demands (Kerr et al., 2005; cf.
Hertel et al., 2000, Experiment 2). Finally, still
other research demonstrates that the identity
of one’s partner may moderate the effect, sug-
gesting that impression management concerns
may contribute to it. For example, Lount et al.
(2000) found that males exhibited a larger
Köhler effect when working with a more
capable female than male partner.
One approach to resolving such theoretical
puzzles is to conduct competitive experimental
tests of the alternative theories (e.g. Hertel
et al., 2000, Experiment 2; Kerr et al., 2005). Yet
another approach is to empirically identify
factors or conditions that moderate an effect,
and then evaluate and/or revise contending
explanations in the light of the discovery of
those moderators. The research demonstrating
the moderating role of the discrepancy of
member abilities (Messé et al., 2002) is a good
illustration of the latter approach. We adopted
this ‘identify moderators’ approach in the
current study by examining the impact of
various amounts and timing of performance
feedback on the magnitude of the Köhler
effect. We chose to focus on aspects of workers’
performance feedback, in part, because
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(4)
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previous research demonstrated that one form
of performance feedback—knowledge of
relative ability in the group—plays an import-
ant role in determining how much harder the
weaker member tries under conjunctive con-
ditions (Köhler, 1926; Messé et al., 2002). In
addition, such a manipulation also permits tests
of some of the current explanations for the
effect.
Performance feedback and
identifiability
All research investigating the Köhler effect
has employed continuous feedback of how
well all group members are doing, and
publicly identified the member who quits
first. For example, with the arm-lifting persist-
ence task paradigm that we have used in most
of our prior work, dyad members performed
in sight of one another. They could readily
monitor each other’s performance and notice
who was becoming more fatigued. Moreover,
when one member’s arm dropped sufficiently
to touch the horizontal trip wire, end the
trial, and thereby determine the group’s
score, it was evident to both who this weaker
member was and how long s/he had per-
sisted. The present study asks whether such
continuous performance feedback and identi-
fiability are necessary for or facilitative of the
Köhler effect. Answering these questions is
not only of obvious interest for establishing
the effect’s generality, but could also shed
light on its likely cause(s). Within the three
general causal explanations that have been
advanced—indispensability, social compari-
son, impression management—there are a
number of possible subcases or versions which
make different assumptions about the under-
lying processes and can be competitively
tested via systematic variation in the nature of
performance feedback and member identifia-
bility. For example,
• As noted above, there is evidence that the
effect may be driven by the indispensability of
effort by the group’s weakest member at a
conjunctive task (Hertel et al., 2000; cf. Kerr,
1990; Kerr & Bruun, 1983). There is, though,
more than one way in which this indispens-
ability mechanism might work. It could be
that the simple knowledge that the task is
conjunctive and hence, that the group’s score
will be determined by the poorest single
member performance is sufficient to
motivate supranormal effort by all group
members. We call this version of the indis-
pensability explanation—which stresses the
mere possibility of being indispensable to the
group—the possible indispensability version. 
• Alternatively, it could be that before a
worker increases her/his effort, s/he also
needs some information indicating not just
that it is possible, but that it is probable that
s/he is indeed that least capable member (a
probable indispensability version of the general
indispensability explanation). 
• The goal setting version of the social com-
parison explanation, advanced by Stroebe
et al. (1996), suggests that the less capable
member must already possess the knowledge
that his/her partner is more capable (and,
perhaps, of how much better his/her partner
is) before any motivation gain would occur. 
• However, an implicit competition version of
the social comparison explanation does not
require this prior knowledge. That is, if it is
the concern that one might be outperformed
by a fellow group member that underlies the
effect, all that may be required to boost
one’s motivation is the belief that one could
be revealed as inferior to one’s partner. 
• Finally, any impression management expla-
nation—based on striving to create a favor-
able impression—would predict little or no
motivation gain under conditions where
one’s performance could not be publicly
identified. 
The present design permitted an empirical
check on these and other interesting possibili-
ties by systematically varying the nature of the
performance feedback and identifiability of
the poorer performer. There were four experi-
mental conditions. (1) Our Full-feedback con-
dition paralleled the prior paradigms—group
members had continuous feedback of one
Kerr et al. performance feedback and the köhler effect
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another’s performance and were identifiable to
one another. All of the alternative explanations
presented above predict a robust Köhler effect
in this condition (see Table 1). The three
remaining experimental conditions increas-
ingly restricted performance feedback infor-
mation. (2) In an End-of-trial feedback
condition there was no feedback during the
trial of how well each group member was doing.
Only at the end of the trial did the feedback
indicate who had quit first. Although each
group member had some information about
partner ability as a trial commenced (viz. he
knew that his partner was still persisting, and
hence, had not yet been revealed to be the
weaker member), he had no explicit infor-
mation to indicate who ultimately would prove
to be the weaker member. This condition was
included primarily to determine if joint, con-
tinuous feedback of group members’ perform-
ance is necessary for the Köhler effect; none of
the theoretical explanations presume that it is,
and so again, all predict that the effect will be
replicated in the End-of-trial condition (see
Table 1). (3) More theoretically interesting is
the Delayed-feedback condition. Here infor-
mation about who quit first (but not when) was
provided, but only some time after the trial was
over. This condition created an interesting type
of conjunctive task in which a worker has no
way of knowing while engaged in the task
whether or not his partner has already quit and
thereby ended the trial. Thus, one cannot tell if
one’s own continuing efforts on the group’s
behalf may be wasted (i.e. if one can make any
unique contribution to the group; Harkins &
Petty, 1982; Weldon & Gargano, 1988). The
latter possibility seems likely to be demotivating
and could well attenuate the Köhler effect. Fur-
thermore, in this condition, two of the theor-
etical explanations predict no Köhler effect
(see Table 1). The probable indispensability
interpretation holds that one needs infor-
mation during the trial suggesting that one’s
efforts are indispensable to the group, but such
information is unavailable in this condition
until after the trial is over. And the goal setting
explanation requires prior knowledge of one’s
partner’s better performance before one sets
and strives toward a higher goal. Again, no such
information is available until after the trial is
completed in this condition. Two other expla-
nations predict a motivation gain, but suggest
that it could be somewhat attenuated (see Table
1). The Delayed-feedback condition offers no
chance for intragroup comparison during the
performance trial, but does after some delay; to
the degree that one strives to avoid an invidious
future comparison as well as an immediate one,
the implicit competition mechanism would
predict some motivation gain. Likewise, the
delayed feedback of this condition only reveals
who quit first in the group, but nothing about
how long he persisted. So even if one does
poorly, less negative information will be
revealed to others. Thus, the impression manage-
ment explanation also predicts an attenuated
effect. (4) Finally, in the No-feedback con-
dition, no one could tell either who quit first or
how long either had persisted. Only one expla-
nation still predicts a significant motivation
gain in this condition; the conjunctive task
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(4)
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Table 1. Predictions of alternative theoretical explanations
Experimental condition
End-of-trial Delayed-
Theoretical explanations Full-feedback feedback feedback No-feedback
Possible indispensability ++ ++ ++ ++
Probable indispensability ++ ++ 0 0
Goal setting ++ ++ 0 0
Implicit competition ++ ++ + 0
Impression management ++ ++ + 0
Note: ++ signifies a robust Köhler effect; + signifies an attenuated effect; 0 signifies no effect.
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demands are known to all, so if only the possi-
bility that one’s efforts might be indispensable
to the group is sufficient to produce the effect,
the possible indispensability explanation predicts
that the effect should be replicated here (see
Table 1). However, the impoverished feedback
provided in this condition eliminates infor-
mation held to be necessary for the effect by all
the remaining explanations (viz. information
that one’s performance is more likely than
one’s partner’s to be particularly indispensable
to the group; information that one’s partner is
setting a higher performance standard; infor-
mation indicating that one is or may be out-
performed by one’s partner; or performance
information that could contribute to a negative
impression by one’s partner). Although this
design does not provide direct competitive tests
between all possible theoretical models, it can
narrow the range of plausible explanations
(Platt, 1964), as well as establishing possible
boundary conditions for the effect. 
Method
Participants
A total of 217 male undergraduates at Michigan
State University participated in this research.
All participants received credit in their intro-
ductory psychology course. In addition, all were
made aware that they could earn a monetary
reward for performing well.
Experimental design
There were four experimental dyad conditions
and an individual control condition. In the
latter, subjects performed all trials in isolation
and individually. This control condition was
included to estimate and then take into
account the effects of fatigue and boredom on
effort. The four experimental conditions were,
as described above: Full-feedback, End-of-trial
feedback, Delayed-feedback, and No-feedback.
Procedure
The experimenter greeted each participant at a
designated location away from the research
laboratory. The participant was told that he
would be working alongside another person,
who had arrived a few minutes earlier and was
already set up in a lab booth. He was also
informed that the experiment was automated
and the experimenter would not be in the lab
room during the session. The participant was
then asked to read and sign a consent form and
follow the instructions at the bottom of the page.
At this point the experimenter left, ostensibly to
go to his/her office. In fact, the experimenter
went to the lab and entered a curtained booth
(located next to the participant’s booth) which
contained a VCR with instruction tapes and the
controls for all experimental equipment.
The instructions at the bottom of the consent
form directed the participant to go to the lab
room, seat himself in the available booth, and
don a set of headphones. (The other, already-
closed booth, ostensibly was occupied by the
second participant, but in reality the experi-
menter sat there.) Prerecorded verbal instruc-
tions were delivered over the headphones,
which also served to mask sounds from the
neighboring booth.
The instructions directed participants to
open up the booth curtains so that they could
see a television monitor on which further direc-
tions and information would be presented.
These instructions stated that the purpose of
the study was to examine the persistence of
people working at a physical task—viz. attach-
ing a weighted bracelet to one’s arm and
holding it extended horizontally at shoulder
height for as long as possible. The video showed
how to secure the weighted (1.8 kg) bracelet
around one’s wrist with Velcro straps.1
Participants were told that they would be per-
forming several trials during their session, but
not the exact number (which was four). At the
beginning of each trial, the videotape would
announce, ‘Get Ready’. At this command, par-
ticipants were to place their arm (with the
weighted bracelet attached) straight out, with
their elbows locked, aligning their wrist to a
mark on the wall of the booth. This mark was
approximately 12 inches above an infrared trip
beam. A moment later, the ‘Go’ signal would be
given, marking the start of the trial. Participants
were to hold their arm above the trip beam for
as long as they could without risking undue
Kerr et al. performance feedback and the köhler effect
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fatigue or injury. When a participant’s arm
dropped to the horizontal, the beam would be
broken and the trial would be over. The trial
score, automatically recorded by computer, was
simply the number of seconds that the partici-
pant persisted at the task. Inside each partici-
pant’s booth was a signal light that illuminated
when the beam was broken. At this point, the
participant was to rest his arm and wait for the
next trial to begin.
To further motivate the participants, all par-
ticipants were told before they began the first
trial that they had an opportunity to earn
money through their performance at the per-
sistence task. The experimenters would sum up
all of the scores on all of the trials that he and
the other participant completed. They were
then told that when data collection for the
study was finished, the experimenters would
randomly pick one of the pairs taking part in
the study. The chosen pair would receive five
cents for every second that the pair of partici-
pants lasted at the task, with the total sum being
split evenly between the two participants.
Hence, there was an extrinsic incentive that was
the same for all conditions, including the indi-
vidual (coacting) controls.
Every participant first completed one trial
with his dominant arm, and then a second trial
with his non-dominant arm. For these first two
trials the participant could not see how the
person in the other booth was performing.
Moreover background noise that the partici-
pant heard through his headphones masked
any possible auditory clues to the other’s activi-
ties. The videotape was recorded so that each
trial could last for a maximum of 4.5 minutes.
If a participant persisted this long (a very rare
event), he was instructed to lower his arm and
prepare for the next trial.
The experimental manipulations were
imposed between the second and third trials, as
follows:
Individual control condition. After a wait
sufficient to give as much rest time to these par-
ticipants as to those in the other, experimental
conditions (who received additional instruc-
tions), participants in this control condition
followed the same procedure as before. They
completed two more trials, the third with their
dominant arm and the fourth with their non-
dominant arm. Note that—except for the
differences between individual and group per-
formance of direct interest here (viz. in collab-
orative work and its attendant differences in
indispensability of effort, mutual performance
feedback and social comparison oppor-
tunities)—the work conditions for these indi-
vidual controls were the same as for the
experimental dyad conditions. In particular,
there were no experimental-control differences
in ‘mere presence’ of others (Zajonc, 1965) or
in possible distracters.
Experimental dyad conditions. After Trial 2,
participants in the experimental conditions
were told that they would henceforth work at
the persistence task with the other person in a
two-person team. On these dyad trials, the team
score would be determined by the first team
member to hit the beam; thus, the task
demands were conjunctive. The two persons to
be randomly selected to receive a cash reward
for their performance would be on the same
team and the reward for dyad trials would be
based on team performance.2 Like their indi-
vidual control counterparts, the participants
assigned to work as dyad members performed
the third trial with their dominant arm and the
fourth with their non-dominant arm. There
were four different dyad conditions.
(1) Full-feedback Condition: In this con-
dition, participants were able to continuously
monitor one another’s performance during
each dyadic trial. Prior to each trial, each
extended a collapsible radio antenna that was
attached to the weight bracelet. The extended
antennas could be seen from the neighboring
booths, so that each could always see the
position of coworker’s arm by the height and
angle of that person’s antenna. In addition,
there was a heretofore-dormant stand set up in
front of the television monitor. There were two
lights on the stand, one labeled ‘A’ (the osten-
sible coworker’s booth) and the other ‘B’ (the
actual participant’s booth). When either
member’s arm broke his infrared beam, his
respective light on the stand would illuminate,
thus signaling the end of the trial to both.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(4)
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Therefore, participants would be immediately
aware of which member quit first for each dyad
trial, and when. However, the computer would
only record the team score and the experi-
menter, who was ostensibly not in the room,
could not determine who quit first.
During the third and fourth (dyad) trials, the
experimenter simulated the performance of a
partner, who always persisted longer than the
actual participant (that is, the experimenter’s
arm stayed well above the beam until the par-
ticipant’s arm broke it; this was not difficult
because the experimenter did not wear a
weighted bracelet). After the third trial, the
light on the stand, which showed that the actual
participant had quit first, remained illuminated
until just before Trial 4 began. And as with the
earlier trials, between trials the participant
rested for a few minutes, moved the bracelet to
the other arm, and waited for the next trial to
begin. After Trial 4, the signal light, once again
indicating that the actual participant had quit
first, remained on until the end of the session.
(2) End-of-trial feedback Condition: The
instructions and procedure for this condition
were identical to those in the preceding, 
Full-feedback condition with one exception:
There was no mention of the antennas, which
remained collapsed throughout the entire
session. Thus, the participant could not
monitor how well his partner was doing during
either dyad trial, and only discovered at the end
of the trial (when his arm hit the beam and
both his in-booth and the signal-stand lights lit
up) that he, himself, had quit first, and hence,
ended the trial.
(3) Delayed-feedback Condition: The instruc-
tions and procedure for this condition were
identical to those in the preceding, End-of-trial
condition, with one exception: When the par-
ticipant’s arm hit the beam, his in-booth light
illuminated immediately, but the light on the
external stand (which was visible to both dyad
members) did not become lit until a few
seconds before the start of the next trial.
Hence, the feedback about which dyad
member quit first was delayed for a few minutes
after the end of the trial. Moreover, this
feedback did not reveal how long each member
had worked. While he was working, the partici-
pant could not tell if he or his partner had quit
first, but he was aware that this information
would be revealed to both of them just before
the start of the next trial.
(4) No-feedback Condition: The instructions
and procedure for this condition were identical
to those in the preceding, Delayed-feedback
condition, with one exception: there was no
mention or use of either the antenna or of the
external light stand. Thus, participants were
aware that neither dyad member (nor the
experimenter) would know which member quit
first on any trial. Participants in this condition
were informed that because of the way in which
the equipment was wired, the computer would
record and save only the length of the trial, and
not which person ended the trial. They were
also instructed that the light in their booth
would come on as soon as they had broken the
beam. However, they would never know which
member of the team had quit first.
Results
Analysis of control individuals’ performance
data
A preliminary analysis of the performance of
the 38 participants in the Individual Control
condition was conducted via a 2 (Trial block) 
 2 (Trial within block) repeated-measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) on the amount of
time per trial that they kept their arm above the
beam. The latter factor is functionally an Arm
(dominant vs. non-dominant) variable, since
participants performed Trials 1 and 3 with their
dominant arms and Trials 2 and 4 with their
non-dominant arms. There was a significant
Trial (Arm) main effect (F(1,37) = 4.39, p < .05,
2 = .11) indicating that control participants
persisted longer with their stronger, dominant
arms (174.8s, s = 37.40) than their non-
dominant arms (163.8s, s = 48.79). More
importantly, there was a significant Block main
effect (F(1,37) = 43.83, p < .001, 2 = .54), which
confirmed a strong fatigue/boredom effect.
Specifically, participants persisted longer on
their first trials with each arm (Block 1 mean =
189.0s, s = 44.50) than on their second attempts
Kerr et al. performance feedback and the köhler effect
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(Block 2 mean = 149.6, s = 44.05). The Block 
Trial (Arm) interaction was not significant
(F(1,37) = .88). Hence, the fatigue effect was
about the same for the dominant and non-
dominant arms; the average control subject
persisted 39.4s less on the second testing of an
arm. This value established a potential produc-
tivity baseline (Steiner, 1972) for our dyads.
Thus, any dyad participants who showed less
than a 39.4s decline in their persistence from
Block 1 (when they were working individually)
to Block 2 (when they were working in the
dyad) manifested a motivation gain. 
Analysis of dyad members’ performance data
The primary data were the participants’ change
scores from Block 1 to Block 2. There were two
such scores, one for the dominant arm (Trial 3
– Trial 1) and the other for the non-dominant
arm (Trial 4 – Trial 2). In order to adjust for 
the constant fatigue factor estimated from the
Individual Control participants’ performance,
the fatigue correction (39.4s) was added to
each of these change scores. This provided a
personally normalized estimate of the magni-
tude of motivation gain for the dominant arm
(MGdom = Trial 3 – Trial 1 + 39.4s) and for the
non-dominant arm (MGnondom = Trial 4 – Trial
2 + 39.4s); positive values indicated motivation
gains, while negative values indicated motiva-
tion losses.
A 4 (Feedback conditions)  2 (Arm:
dominant vs. non-dominant) ANOVA with
repeated measures on the latter factor was per-
formed on these motivation gain scores. Only
the Feedback main effect was significant
(F(3,162) = 12.45, p < .001, 2 = .19). There was
no indication that participants had greater
motivation gains with one arm than the other
(Arm main effect F(1,162) = .09). Further, the
effects of feedback condition on motivation
gains were not moderated by Arm (Feedback 
Arm interaction F(3,162) = .44). Hence, below
we report results for the average of the motiva-
tion gain scores across the two arms.
The mean motivation gain scores for the four
experimental conditions (with 95% confidence
intervals) are plotted in Figure 1. In the follow-
ing presentation, we consider the conditions
starting with those providing the most infor-
mation to group members and moving to those
providing less information. First, consider the
Full-feedback condition which mirrors the con-
ditions used in prior studies of the Köhler
effect. Dyad members have continuous
feedback of one another’s performance and
the identity of the first person to quit is known
to both. This condition replicated the robust
Köhler effect observed in the prior studies. The
participants worked 41.7s (s = 36.36, n = 41)
longer than the individual controls; this value is
significantly greater than zero. The same con-
clusion results from including the individual
condition as a control and doing Dunnette tests
comparing experimental conditions with it.
The Full-feedback condition produces a highly
significant motivation gain (p < .001).
In the End-of-trial feedback condition dyad
members had no continuous feedback of each
other’s performance. The participant in this
condition—like the participant in the Full-
feedback condition—is functionally (by experi-
mental contrivance) the less capable member
and, until the moment he himself quits, is con-
tinually aware that his partner has not yet quit.
However, unlike in the Full-feedback condition,
he has no other information indicating that he
is, indeed, the less capable and more indis-
pensable member of the pair (e.g. seeing that
his own arm is starting to drop with fatigue
whereas his partner’s is not). In this condition,
we found that the motivation gain was only
slightly lower (mean = 35.01s, s = 37.25, n = 39)
than in the Full-feedback condition. Both the
95% confidence intervals plotted in Figure 1
and a Dunnette test indicated that the motiva-
tion gain effect in this condition is highly
reliable (p < .001). More importantly, it did not
differ significantly from the gain observed in
the Full-feedback condition (based on a post
hoc, Newman-Keuls comparison). Thus, within
the limits of statistical inference, these data
suggest that continuous performance feedback
is neither necessary nor facilitative for the
Köhler effect.
Next, we considered the Delayed-feedback
condition. Here, the performance feedback was
delayed such that coworkers only learn some
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(4)
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time after the trial was completed which
member quit first, but not when. In this con-
dition, there was a significant (p < .03, Dunnette
test) motivation gain (mean = 20.30s, s = 30.21,
n = 43). However, post hoc Newman-Keuls
comparisons revealed that its magnitude was
significantly less than that in either the Full-
feedback or the End-of-trial feedback con-
ditions. The reduction in feedback for this
condition clearly attenuated the Köhler effect,
but did not eliminate it.
Finally, consider the No-feedback condition.
Here, there was no information available to
indicate which dyad member quit first. Figure 1
reveals that, in fact, the mean performance in
the No-feedback condition (mean = .21s, s =
30.70, n = 43) was considerably (and signifi-
cantly, according to Newman-Keuls post hoc
tests) smaller than the already attenuated gain
observed in the Delayed-feedback condition.
Moreover, in the present No-feedback con-
dition, there was no significant motivation gain
at all (p > .99, Dunnette test).
Discussion
In this study we explored the effects of varying
the amount and timing of information group
members receive about one another’s perform-
ance while working at a conjunctive persistence
task. Our specific goals were to identify possible
feedback-based boundary and facilitative con-
ditions for the Köhler motivation gain effect,
and thereby, to inform the search for the under-
lying cause of this motivation gain phenomenon
(and, perhaps, other such phenomena yet to be
discovered). Our findings, summarized in
Figure 1, justify a number of conclusions.
Performance feedback and the generality of
the Köhler motivation gain effect 
Our results suggest that continuous feedback of
the absolute (and hence, relative) levels of
performance of all group members is not
necessary for the Köhler effect—the magnitude
of the effect when group members had this
information (Full-feedback condition) was not
Kerr et al. performance feedback and the köhler effect
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significantly greater than when group members
did not have it (End-of-trial feedback). This
lack of difference has a number of interesting
implications: (a) the external validity of the
Köhler effect is extended to tasks without such
continuous performance feedback, and, in
addition, (b) the phenomenon can be studied
using simpler experimental paradigms that
dispense with such feedback (cf. Hertel et al.,
2003).
At the other extreme—of no performance
feedback whatsoever and complete anonymity
of group member contributions—we found no
trace of the Köhler motivation gain effect. Thus,
to produce this phenomenon, it is not sufficient
that the group’s tasks simply have conjunctive
task demands; in addition, it appears that there
must be some possibility of group members (or
perhaps, others; Harkins, 2001) knowing or
being able to identify the relative abilities of
group members. Besides eliminating a number
of group performance contexts as likely settings
for producing this motivation gain, any feasible
explanation for the effect must incorporate this
boundary condition.
Finally, we identified some conditions that
attenuated but did not eliminate the effect.
Those conditions were (a) providing no infor-
mation to group members about how well they
each were performing as they worked, but (b)
providing information about which member
performed less well sometime after the task was
completed. Clearly, for those seeking to
maximize member motivation and group per-
formance at conjunctive tasks, it would be
useful not to delay relative performance
feedback. 
It is important to note that, even with the
limiting and boundary conditions discovered
here, the set of group tasks for which we might
reasonably expect to obtain the Köhler motiva-
tion gain effect is potentially still quite large
(Kelley et al., 2003). The full set of group tasks
with conjunctive features includes: 
• Unitary persistence tasks (such as the group
task used in this experiment) or other per-
formance tasks in which group members
simultaneously engage in the identical task
and task demands limit group performance
to the poorest performance in the group.
The conjunctive nature of the task can stem
from the rules of the task and the definition
of collective performance (as in our experi-
mental task). But they can also stem from
group members being yoked or tethered, so
that a slow or poorly performing member
holds back the rest of the group (e.g.
tethered mountain-climbing teams or a
group of commuters trying to get home
along a single-lane highway). 
• Divisible tasks where the complete task is not
finished or satisfactory unless each group
member has finished his/her portion satis-
factorily. An example would be a group of
four coauthors who divided the task of
writing a research article, with one doing the
Introduction, another the Method, etc. An
inadequate job by any one of the coauthors
would result in an inadequate combined
draft. Hertel et al. (2003) have reported a
robust Köhler effect for just such a divisible
task. Dyads worked at a business simulation
in which they matched customers’ computer
and computer-furniture needs with a list of
product options, trying to find the package
that provided the highest profit for the firm.
The order was not complete until both parts
were complete (i.e. filling the order for
computer components and filling the order
for computer furniture). Compared to
control individuals responsible only for com-
pleting their own orders, dyad members
responsible for the computer orders worked
faster and more accurately with a partner
who worked faster than they did. It is also
worth noting that this conceptual replica-
tion of the Köhler effect was obtained for a
fairly complex, cognitive performance task
(rather than the fairly simple, motor persist-
ence task we used in the present and several
other experiments).
• Sequential group tasks, for which one group
member cannot begin his/her job until
preceding members have completed their
jobs. An illustration might be a swimming
relay team. Each member must wait for all
the preceding members to complete their
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(4)
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laps before s/he can enter the pool. A sub-
standard performance by any member
ensures a poor team performance.
To be sure, the present study suggests that there
does need to be some level of publicness and
timely feedback about who can do what before
we would expect to see a robust Köhler effect in
such tasks. However, these limiting conditions
still leave a very large and interesting set of
collective tasks where we might expect reliable
Köhler motivation gains. Of course, the
external validity of the effect is largely an open
question and needs to be explored empirically
in future research. 
Narrowing the range of plausible theoretical
explanations
There are currently a number of plausible
explanations for the Köhler motivation gain
effect. Although we have not completed the
search for the ‘correct’ explanation(s) in this
study, we have made some progress toward that
goal. In particular, the present data refute at
least three variants of older, general expla-
nations and suggest a novel variant.
‘Indispensability of effort’ as an explanation
One explanation for the Köhler motivation
gain (Kerr, 1990; Kerr & Bruun, 1983) attrib-
utes it to the fact that when a group faces a con-
junctive task, the performance of the group
depends vitally on the performance of one
member—the least capable member—and it is
the indispensability of that member’s efforts
that prompts him/her to work especially hard.
The absence of any motivation gain in our
No-feedback condition contradicts one version
of this indispensability explanation—one that
assumes that mere knowledge that the task is
conjunctive is sufficient to produce a motiva-
tion gain (the possible indispensability version).
More than this knowledge is clearly required. 
There are other versions of the indispens-
ability explanation, however. It could be that
before a worker increases her/his effort, s/he
also needs some information indicating that it
is probable that s/he is indeed that least
capable member (the probable indispensability
version). Just such information was available in
both our Full- and End-of-trial feedback con-
ditions, which produced the strongest motiva-
tion gains. In both of these conditions, there
was a type of continuous feedback—infor-
mation confirming that one’s partner was still
persisting. In the Full-feedback condition, there
was clear visual evidence that the partner never
seemed to tire. In the End-of-trial condition,
the information was less explicit and detailed,
but informative nonetheless. As the subject
began to tire and to approach his own limit of
endurance, the fact that his partner had not yet
reached his/her limit made it increasingly
likely that the subject was the weaker of the
pair. Thus, both conditions provided infor-
mation to the subject during the trial and prior
to his own decision to quit that suggested that
he was very probably the weaker member of the
dyad. 
This explanation would suggest that when
such information was missing, one would
observe no motivation gain. Hence, it is con-
sistent with the null effect in the No-feedback
condition, where one had no means of ascer-
taining that one was the less capable member.
However, it would also predict a null effect in
the Delayed-feedback condition. Here, only
some time after the trial was completed could
one learn that one was the less capable member
of the dyad. Nevertheless, there was a signifi-
cant (although attenuated) motivation gain
found in this condition. Therefore, the probable
dispensability explanation, by itself, cannot fully
explain the overall pattern of results. 
Participants in the Delayed-feedback con-
dition should have had no information to
suggest to them or to their partners that their
efforts were indispensable to the group’s
success. However, group success/failure might
not be the only outcome of concern. Being
publicly revealed to be the ‘weak link’ in the
group (and, hence, responsible for a poor
group performance, having let one’s partner
down, or having limited the effectiveness of
one’s partner’s performance) may also be
viewed as an aversive outcome. Increased effort
would be instrumental in avoiding such an
outcome in all but the No-feedback condition.
Kerr et al. performance feedback and the köhler effect
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These two concerns—with the indispensability
of one’s efforts for the group’s success and with
being revealed as the team’s ‘weak link’—
together could account for the pattern of moti-
vation gain differences found across all four
dyad conditions.
Social comparison explanations As noted
earlier, Stroebe et al. (1996) have argued that
the Köhler motivation gain may result from a
process of social comparison in which learning
that another is more capable leads the less
capable group member to raise his/her per-
formance goals. This goal setting explanation
cannot account for the significant (attenuated)
motivation gain observed in the Delayed-
feedback condition, where the participant
could, at best, only compare with his partner
sometime after the task was completed. An
advocate of this theory might argue that a par-
ticipant could compare himself with his partner
when he received the delayed Trial 3 feedback
and that the attenuated motivation gain
observed in this condition was the result of a
strong gain on the subsequent Trial 4, averaged
with no gain on Trial 3. The nonsignificance of
the Feedback condition  Trial interaction
contradicts this argument, but to give it its
strongest possible test, we specifically examined
the effect of Trial (i.e. Trial 3 vs. Trial 4) within
the Delayed-feedback condition. The means
were in the direction suggested by this
argument (viz. Trial 3 mean = 16.7s motivation
gain, Trial 4 mean = 24.04s motivation gain),
but the difference was clearly nonsignificant
(t(42) = .91, p = .37). Hence, the goal setting
explanation also cannot account for the full
pattern of results from this study. 
But perhaps it is only the ‘goal setting’ notion
that is problematic. Maybe group members do
engage in social comparison, but the result of
that process is (or can be) something other
than setting a personal performance goal. One
possibility, hinted at by Stroebe et al. (1996), is
that the ‘something’ might be an attempt to
successfully compete with the other—to out-
perform or, perhaps, to avoid being outper-
formed. Such an implicit competition explanation
is fairly consistent with the full pattern of the
present results. When group members believed
that their partner was more capable (as in the
Full-feedback or End-of-trial conditions), they
increased their effort to successfully compete
with him. When there was no possibility of
either group member successfully outperform-
ing the other (as in the No-feedback condition,
where no one could tell who performed
better), there was no motivation gain. The
Delayed-feedback condition represents an
interesting intermediate case in which one had
little idea of which was the stronger group
member as one performed, but one might later
be shown to have been outperformed by one’s
partner. If the likelihood of working harder
declines with the certainty that one is about to
be outperformed, then we would expect con-
ditions that reduced this certainty (like the
Delayed-feedback conditions) to attenuate the
motivation gain effect. This is exactly what
happened.
Another possibility is that the ‘something’
underlying a social comparison process is an
attempt to evaluate and validate one’s own task
ability, basic premises of the original social com-
parison theory (Festinger, 1954).3 That is, one
may want both to see just what one is capable of
(to evaluate one’s ability) and to meet (or
surpass) available social comparison targets (if
possible, to show that one has relatively high
ability). Such a self-evaluation version of the
more general social comparison explanation
predicts high striving when the ‘other’ is likely
to be more capable (Full-feedback and End-of-
trial conditions), and no increase in striving
when there is no way of telling just how the
group members compare (No-feedback con-
dition). Again, the Delayed-feedback condition
presents a less immediate or certain oppor-
tunity for self evaluation. In this condition,
one’s performance could eventually be
compared with another person’s and could be
shown to be inferior. However, the risk of these
outcomes is only a possibility in this condition,
rather than a high probability (as in the Full
and End-of-trial conditions). 
In sum, two similar social comparison pro-
cesses—both directed at achieving a favorable
comparison of abilities—are consistent with the
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 8(4)
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full pattern of our present results, including the
attenuated motivation gain observed in the
Delayed-feedback condition. The latter attenu-
ation effect could also be attributed to (a) lower
concern about being revealed as the ‘weak link’
in the team (b) a risk of wasted effort or (c)
reduced risks of an unfavorable social evalu-
ation in this condition. It will require additional
research to tease apart whether and to what
degree each of these explanations contributes
to the attenuation effect observed here.
Impression management concerns and the
Köhler effect Another notion that is quite
consistent with the present results is that the
Köhler effect may ultimately stem from a desire
to create a favorable (or avoid creating an un-
favorable) impression among others. Each
decrease in motivation we obtained was accom-
panied by a decrease in the availability of
performance-relevant information to one’s
partner. In the Full and End-of-trial feedback
conditions, the participant’s status as the less
capable group member was immediately
evident as soon as he quit. In the Delayed-
feedback condition, with its attenuated motiva-
tion gain, others could only discover who failed
first (and even that revelation would only be
made sometime after the trial was completed)
but not when he failed. And in the No-feedback
condition, which produced no motivation gain,
no one could tell who quit first or how long he
worked.
To further explore the role of impression
management concerns, it would be informative
to systematically vary ‘who knows what when’
across all possible sources of evaluation—the
self, fellow group members, and non-performing
observers (e.g. the experimenter), much as
Harkins and Szymanski did in their productive
program of research on the role of evaluation
for social loafing (e.g. Harkins & Szymanski,
1989; Szymanski & Harkins, 1993). This would
also include asymmetric feedback conditions in
which different evaluators had access to differ-
ent information; for example, a condition in
which only P has full performance feedback of
dyad members, but his/her partner and the
experimenter do not. 
Note that this emphasis on impression man-
agement need not contradict or compete with
the other explanations of the Köhler effect.
Rather, it may complement those explanations.
For example, concern with the indispensability
of one’s contribution to the group may reflect
concern with how others would evaluate an
indispensable group member who performed
poorly. And one may try to keep up with a more
capable teammate precisely because one is con-
cerned about how one would be evaluated if
one could not keep up. If so, then one insight
of our study may be that group members are
most likely to exert supranormal levels of effort
on their group’s behalf when there are salient
social incentives for doing so. If so, maximizing
effort in work groups, teams, and organizations
may depend as much or more on social psycho-
logical factors (such as establishing a favorable
impression in others) as on more traditional,
non-psychological factors (e.g. task engage-
ment; pay). 
Conclusions and qualifications
In this study, we systematically varied what
group members knew about one another’s
ability and when they knew it as they worked at
a conjunctive group task. Besides establishing
some informative boundary conditions on the
Köhler motivation gain effect, our results show
that certain explanations are insufficient to
fully account for the effect. Specifically, the
effect cannot be attributed solely to (a) con-
junctive task demands per se making one feel
indispensable to the group, or (b) using a more
capable member’s performance to set a high
performance goal. Our results also increase the
plausibility that certain social comparison pro-
cesses contribute to the effect. Specifically, our
results are consistent with two such processes:
(a) attempts to prevail in an intragroup com-
petition with one’s partner, and (b) attempts to
see just what one is capable of (to evaluate one’s
ability) and to meet (or surpass) available social
comparison targets (if possible, to show that
one has relatively high ability). In addition,
results from other studies (Hertel et al., 2000,
Exp. 2; Kerr et al., 2005) as well as certain
Kerr et al. performance feedback and the köhler effect
387
03 Kerr 056466 (bc-s)  30/9/05  1:51 pm  Page 387
results from the present study, also suggest that
the effect is stronger when one’s contribution is
clearly indispensable to the group, even when
opportunities for social comparison are held
constant.
A running controversy in the group motiva-
tion area asks, ‘what is the most appropriate
baseline against which to contrast group-
member motivation?’ Some (e.g. Karau &
Williams, 1993; Williams & Karau, 1991) have
suggested that coactors—individuals working
independently but in the ‘presence’ of one
another, in one or another sense (e.g. visible to
one another, able to monitor one another’s
performance)—provide the most appropriate
baseline. Others (e.g. Markus, 2001; Todd, Kerr,
Messé, & Seok, in press) have argued that
isolated individuals represent better baselines,
because coaction conditions can include some
of the psychological processes available in
groups (e.g. the opportunity for social compari-
son). Clearly, in this paper we have used indi-
viduals as the baseline to define our motivation
gain effects. However, in other, in progress work
(Kerr et al., 2005) we have run coactor con-
ditions in which the participant worked (and was
rewarded) individually, but got the same
feedback about another worker as a participant
in the present conjunctive dyads (i.e. the coactor
always outperformed the participant). This
coactor condition tends to produce a reliable
but weaker motivation gain than conjunctive/
dyad conditions. The clear implication is that
the Köhler effect is partially driven by social
comparison (present in both coaction and con-
junctive conditions) and partially by an indis-
pensability mechanism (additionally present in
the conjunctive/dyad condition). The picture
that is beginning to emerge is that there is
probably not a single, unitary explanation for
the motivation gain phenomenon first discov-
ered by O. Köhler. A number of psychological
processes are likely to be involved (e.g. social
comparison, perceived indispensability of effort,
perceived efficiency of effort, striving to create
a favorable impression in others).
It also seems likely that different group or
task contexts will alter the relative importance
of these processes. For example, it seems likely
that attempts to achieve a favorable ability
comparison would be stronger in contexts
where one’s ego is threatened (e.g. a male being
outperformed by a female at a task requiring
physical strength; Lount et al., 2000). It seems
likely that attempts to fulfill one’s role as the
group’s indispensable member would be
stronger in contexts where one cared more
about the group, one’s standing in the group,
and its success (e.g. in highly cohesive groups;
when group identification was strong; Halsam,
2001, Chapter 9). The immediate challenge is to
better understand exactly when and how these
processes operate. Through such research, we
may attain a more comprehensive and inte-
grated understanding of how and why group
work can be both motivating and demotivating.
Notes
1. This motor persistence task is similar in many
respects to the task originally used by Köhler
(1926, 1927), and has a number of important
features (e.g. performance depends on little
beside effort; performance can safely be assumed
to be related monotonically to effort; cf. Hertel
et al., 2000). However, none of the currently
viable explanations for the Köhler motivation
gain effect suggest that it is restricted to such
simple motor tasks. And indeed, the effect has
been replicated with a reasonably complex
cognitive task (Hertel et al., 2003).
2. These instructions ensured that the extrinsic
incentive was the same for participants in all
conditions, under plausible assumptions (viz. that
the coacting participant would score comparably
to the participant; that both dyad members would
receive the same team score).
3. Thanks to Garold Stasser for suggesting this
interesting possibility.
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